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1 Introduction
In 1991, Marc Weiser formulated his vision of Ubiquitous
Computing, see Weiser (1991): Individual devices such
as personal computer will be replaced by “intelligent
things” and these things support humans in an
imperceptible manner. About two and a half decades
later, this vision has become increasingly realistic:
Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
pervades every aspect of our daily lives, since it is
embedded in the environments that we encounter on
a daily basis. In contrast to Weiser’ initial description,
services are still directly accessible through devices such
as smart phones, but we also observe trends towards
automated machine interaction as e.g. formulated by
the Internet-of-Things, see Greengard (2015). As a
consequence, we can observe an increasing number of
interconnected and autonomous systems that interact in
a demand-oriented manner, cf. Tomforde et al. (2014).
In order to cope with the arising complexity, the
solutions are typically characterised by heterogeneous,
self-adaptive sub-systems that are loosely coupled and
cooperating in a dynamically changing system structure.
A major drawback in such complex structures is that
only limited access control can be applied—meaning that
the system is in principle open for participants to freely
join in and leave.
Openness, heterogeneity, and dynamics introduce
uncertainty about the expected behaviour of the
participating elements—we will refer to entities or
elements within these interconnected system structures
as agents throughout the article, since we assume
technical solutions acting on behalf of a user, see
Wooldridge (2001). One way to cope with this kind
of uncertainty is to establish computational trust (see
Castelfranchi & Falcone (2010) for a definition) relations
among agents and incorporate this concept within the
decision logic when choosing interaction partners.
Consider a Desktop Computing Grid as an
exemplary application where aspects like openness and
heterogeneity play an important role. In such a grid
system, participants cooperate in terms of sharing
their computing resources, cf. Choi et al. (2008).
More precisely, they process computational jobs for
each other following the concept of mutuality. In
general, participation is only beneficial if agents behave
cooperatively. As a consequence, uncooperative or even
malicious agents have to be isolated to maintain the
best possible utility for benevolent agents. This can
be achieved by establishing trust relationships, i.e.
estimations of how cooperative interaction partners will
behave, see Castelfranchi & Falcone (2010). These trust
estimations take own experiences into account as well
as those other (reliable) interaction partners have made
with a certain agent. We will refer to such a trust-
based approach as Trusted Desktop Grid (TDG, cf.
Bernard et al. (2010)) within this article and use it as
application scenario for investigating decentralised trust
and reputation schemes.
Especially when realising the underlying trust
mechanism in a fully decentralised manner to avoid
surveillance and central control while simultaneously
taking experiences into account that other, trusted
interaction partners made with a certain entity, novel
challenges come into play. Most importantly, we have
to guarantee the identity of sender and receiver as well
as the correctness of trust values provided by others.
The concept of trust among anonymous agents in a
decentralised system resembles recognition and trust
in ant colonies. Like the trusted interaction partners,
ant colonies comprise hundreds to millions of workers
who do not know each other individually. Mutual trust
and, hence, cooperation, between ant workers is only
achieved by a specific odour signature that is shared
by all colony members. Individuals that do not possess
this signature are attacked and not admitted to the ant
nest. Indeed, there are ”malicious agents” in the form
of other insect species (”ant guests”, such as other ant
species, beetles, butterfly larvae, or silverfishes) who try
to gain access to an ant colony and parasitise on their
food sources, cf. Bagne`res & Lorenzi (2010). Therefore,
a nestmate recognition system is crucial to maintain the
social integrity of the colony and avoid its exploitation
by other insects, cf. Leonhardt et al. (2016). To this end,
this article proposes a novel scheme for trust messages
inspired by nestmate recognition in ants. We call this
concept Trusted Digital Pheromones (TruDiPhe). The
contribution of this article is two-fold: On the one hand,
we present a novel mechanism to allow for a secure
exchange of trust information within distributed agent
societies following a public-key concept. On the other
hand, we analyse the behaviour within simulations of
the TDG by considering different attack levels. In this
context, we refer to the participation of uncooperative
or even malicious agents as attack, since it decreases the
utility of benevolent agents.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows:
Section 2 briefly discusses related work and highlights
the need for a novel decentralised trust mechanism.
Section 3 presents the application scenario: the Trusted
Desktop Computing Grid. Afterwards, we explain our
approach of trusted digital pheromones in Section 4. The
developed techniques are evaluated in Section 5 using
simulations of our application scenario. Finally, Section 6
summarises the article and gives an outlook to future
work.
2 Related Work
In this section, we discuss related work concerning
distributed trust management in open systems inspired
by ant pheromones. First, we describe natural processes
which inspired us, especially colony affiliation and
nestmate recognition among ant colonies. Then trust in
Multi-agent Systems in general is introduced, followed
by attacks and security measures in trust management
systems, as well as (trust in) Desktop Computing Grid
Copyright c© 2009 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.
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Systems in particular. We conclude the section with a
discussion of appropriate performance metrics.
2.1 Nature as Inspiration
Taking ideas from nature and transferring them to
computer science is a well-established approach and the
origin for the Organic Computing initiative, cf. Mu¨ller-
Schloer et al. (2011). Just as Bionics (Dickinson (1999))
has opened up a new field of research dedicated to
the creation of machines inspired by nature, there are
many fields in computer science trying to model natural
behaviour in algorithms. Especially social insects, such
as ants or bees, have attracted interest of many
researchers: Individual insects follow simple rules, yet, as
a group and with the help of a complex, but decentralised
communication system, they can effectively organise
concerted actions (Leonhardt et al. (2016)). This
principle can be transferred to technical systems: each
insect represents an individual part of a system, and
when they work together, effects may occur which cannot
fully be foreseen. This refers to the concept of emergence,
cf. Mnif & Mu¨ller-Schloer (2006). An example of this
is the system of chemical (odour) signatures, which are
used by insects to encode a variety of information.
2.2 Chemical Communication and Nestmate
Recognition in Ant Colonies
Ants communicate using chemical scents (Ho¨lldobler
& Wilson (2009)). For example, they lay out scent
trails (”trail pheromones”) which lead the other colony
members to food sources, cf. Morgan (2009). These
pheromones are chemical messages, which can be passed
from one ant to the other without them meeting
physically.
A different type of scents is used to distinguish
nestmates from individuals of other nests (nestmate
recognition). These ”recognition pheromones” are
cuticular hydrocarbons, which cover every ant’s body
surface and are little volatile. Every ant thus carries
a cuticular hydrocarbon profile, which is perceived by
every individual it encounters and cannot be hidden.
It contains a variety of information, such as gender,
species membership, and colony membership. Upon
touching another individual with the antennae, ants
can decode the information of the other’s scent profile
almost instantly. As a consequence, only members of
the own colony are allowed into the nest, while alien
intruders are attacked and displaced (Leonhardt et al.
(2016)). Each ant produces its own scent, which is largely
genetically determined. The composition of this chemical
blend differs between different individuals even within
the same ant species. The common colony odour, which
is used for nestmate recognition, originates from mixing
scent profiles between individuals. To this end, the ants
groom each other. Thereby, they take up each other’s
and their own cuticular hydrocarbons, which are stored
in a specialised gland (the postpharyngeal gland), mixed,
and redistributed onto themselves and other ants when
cleaning or touching them (d’Ettorre & Lenoir (2010),
Leonhardt et al. (2016)). This nestmate recognition
system forms the conceptual foundation for our trust
management algorithm.
2.3 Trust in Multi-agent Systems
The concept of trust in Multi-agent Systems (MAS)
(Wooldridge (2001), Ramchurn et al. (2004)) is well
studied in fields such as economy, evolutionary biology,
anthropology, and sociology (Mui (2002)). The term is
typically defined as follows: “Trust is a belief an agent
has that the other party will do what it says it will (being
honest and reliable) or reciprocate (being reciprocative
for the common good of both), given an opportunity to
defect to get higher payoffs” (Ramchurn et al. (2004))
and “Without trust, the (human) society would cease to
exist” (Vu (2010)). Trust enables us to interact with all
other people, also those whom we have never met before.
Every person is first of all concerned with his or her
individual interests, but still expects certain behaviours
by other people and relies on them. Therefore, trust is
an essential basis for a functioning society (Luhmann
(1979)). In contrast, the closely related term Reputation
is usually seen as the combined trust value of many
agents which are rating one single agent (Mui (2002),
Aberer et al. (2006)).
2.4 Attacks and Security Measures
Several disadvantages come with the openness and
anonymity of MAS, such as online communities, and
the autonomy of agents in these system. For example,
malicious agents can participate without other agents
being aware of their existence. In general, for an agent
to act maliciously and exploit the system, the benefit
of an attack must outweigh the costs, and the pay-off
must be higher than the potential punishment if the
attack is monitored and sanctioned (assuming rational
behaviour). If the system simply makes it unattractive
for an attacker to exploit it, one speaks of a soft security
approach. If this is not enough, we need hard security
mechanisms, such as cryptography, to make the attacks
harder and even impossible (Carrara & Hogben (2007),
Vu (2010)).
2.5 Desktop Computing Grid Systems
Desktop Computing Grid Systems such as the TDG
(Section 3) are used to share resources between multiple
administrative authorities. One example for a peer-to-
peer based system is the ShareGrid Project (Anglano
et al. (2008)). A second approach is the Organic
Grid, a peer-to-peer based approach with decentralised
scheduling (Chakravarti et al. (2004)). Compared to our
system, these approaches assume benevolence (Wang &
Vassileva (2004)), i.e. that there are no malicious agents
participating and misbehaving. Another approach is the
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open source Berkeley Open Infrastructure for Network
Computing Project (BOINC, Anderson & Fedak (2006))
which follows the same routine, creating several replicas
over and over again, and looking for differences in
the results. This ensues in a large amount of replicas
and, in consequence, huge computing power overhead.
XtremWeb (Fedak et al. (2001)) aims at setting up
a global computing application and “harvest[ing] the
idle time of Internet connected computers which may
be widely distributed across the world, to run a
very large and distributed application” with an ad-
hoc verification process for participating computers. A
panoramic view on computational trust in MAS can be
found in Ramchurn et al. (2004), Castelfranchi & Falcone
(2010), or Sabater & Sierra (2005).
2.6 Performance Metrics
In order to compare different approaches of reputation
systems, the performance of those systems has to be
measured. A useful metric should show the direct benefit
gained by each or all agents, independent of reputation
system details. Zacharia & Maes (2000) and Carbo et
al. (2003) both use the development of reputation values
of malicious agents over time. While the reputation
obviously decreases in their evaluations, it is difficult to
tell how good this decrease is compared to other systems.
Multiple approaches were plotted in one diagram in
Carbo et al. (2002), but it remains unclear how much
the performance of the systems differs. Kamvar et al.
(2003) test their system by plotting the load distribution.
In a reputation system where users always choose peers
with the highest reputation for an interaction, these
highly rated peers receive almost all of the requests. Due
to limitations in bandwidth or computing power, the
favoured peers cannot serve all enquiries. This decreases
their reputation, until only a few requesters remain and
the reputation increases again. This oscillating behaviour
means an unnecessary overhead to the system, since
each rejection delays the successful processing of the
request. The better the load is distributed, the less
waiting time the agents have to endure. Therefore, equal
load distribution is one indicator of an efficient system.
Furthermore, the benefit for a single agent is not obvious,
since it arises only indirectly through shorter waiting
times, which means more work finished in the same
time. The interaction success (failure) rate (Xiong & Liu
(2004), similar to the fraction of (in)authentic downloads
in Kamvar et al. (2003)), measures the percentage
of all interactions with a positive (negative) outcome.
Here, one value is measured independently of reputation
system details, but still does not take the direct benefit
into account, e.g. one single agent in a TDG system
which successfully processes one single work unit at a
time would have a perfect score regarding this metric. A
metric satisfying all of our requirements, albeit limited to
the area of TDG systems, is speedup (Klejnowski (2014)).
It is defined as the relation between the time it would
have taken a single agent to process all work by itself
and the time it actually takes to process the work (units)
distributedly.
3 Application Scenario: Trusted Desktop
Grid
We consider an open, distributed Trusted Desktop
Grid (TDG) as application scenario for the distributed
verification of trust values. In this scenario, we use an
open and heterogeneous MAS and we do not assume
benevolence. The agents in the system cooperate to
gain an advantage. The mechanism determining this
cooperation is trust. Because of the openness of the
system, different agents may try to exploit it. They may
be uncooperative, malfunctioning or even malicious.
An agent, which acts on behalf of the user, is
submitting jobs it wants to have calculated (Klejnowski
(2014)). Each job is composed of several independently
processable work units (WUs). The agents are expected
to volunteer their machines as workers for other agents’
WUs as well as to share their resources. If two agents
have cooperated, they evaluate each other afterwards.
3.1 Agent Goal and Global Goal
The benefit of an agent can be measured by the
speedup σ, informally speaking the benefit achieved by
distributedly processing a task, compared to having
to process all work on its own (in accordance
with Klejnowski (2014)). An agent has multiple ratings
with values between 0 and 1 that it gets from other
agents. The amount of ratings stored in the queue at any
time is limited. As a consequence, ratings are forgotten
after some time. The global average of all ratings for
one single agent is called reputation. For further details
see Kantert et al. (2015). These ratings allow to estimate
the future behaviour of an agent, based on its previous
actions. In our system, agents get a higher rating, if they
work for other agents and a lower rating, if they reject
or cancel work requests, cf. Klejnowski (2014).
A job J is a set of WUs, which is released in time
step trelJ and completed in t
compl
J , when the last WU
is completed. This is why the speedup can only be
determined after the last result has been returned to the
submitter.
The speedup σ in Equation 1 is a metric known from
multi-core systems. It is based on the assumption that
parallelisation helps to process a task (i.e. a job) faster
than processing it on a single core.
σ =
∑
J
(tcomplself − trelself )∑
J
(tcompldist − treldist)
(1)
In short, we can write σ :=
tself
tdist
with tself being the
time it would require an agent to process all WUs of
a job without cooperation, i.e. sequentially. tdist is the
time it takes until all WUs are computed distributedly
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and the last result is returned to the submitting agent.
If no cooperation partners can be found, agents need
to calculate their own WUs. This results in a speedup
value equal to one. In general, we assume that agents
behave selfishly and only cooperate if they can expect
an advantage, i.e. σ > 1.
The global goal—also referred to as the system
goal—is to enable and encourage agents to cooperate
and thereby achieve the best average speedup possible.
The systems’ focus is coordination, i.e. shaping the
environment in a way that allows for cooperation and,
thereby, leads to optimising the global goal.
3.2 Worker and Submitter Component
Each agent is free do decide which agent it wants to pass
WUs to or receive from. Therefore, every agent has a
submitter and a worker component.
The submitter component is the scheduler of the
agent and responsible for distributing WUs. If an agent
receives a job J from the user consisting of multiple
WUs, it creates a list of suited workers, i.e. workers it
trusts. It then asks workers from this list to cooperate
and calculate WUs, until either no more WU or no more
workers are left. If all workers were asked but there are
still unprocessed WUs remaining, the agent calculates
them on its own.
The worker component decides whether an agent
wants to work for a certain submitter. When the agent
receives a request to process a WU, it calculates its
expected reward for accepting and rejecting the WU. If
the reward of accepting the WU prevails, the agent takes
the WU and puts it in its own working queue, where the
WU remains until the agent starts to process it, i.e. until
the other WUs in the queue were processed. Afterwards,
it transfers the result back to the submitter where the
result is validated. A job is completed, if all WUs are
returned to the submitter.
3.3 Agent Types
In the context of our TDG, agents can show malicious
behaviour like returning wrong results, or refusing to
work for other agents while submitting WUs to them.
Behaviour like this can lead to a lower average speedup.
In the following, we discuss different classes of stereo-
type agent behaviour that are considered within our
system.
Adaptive Agents (ADA) are cooperative as long as
their peers act benevolently and give honest ratings.
They work for other agents of good reputation in the
system. If the WU-queue of an ADA is saturated to the
limit of its capacity, the agent may reject another WU.
The trust concepts presented in this article focus on this
group of agents.
Egoists (EGO) accept most work requests but return
fake results with a certain probability (we use a value
of 0.2 within our simulations), this wastes the time of
other agents. The egoists make it necessary to validate
returned, presumably completed jobs. This results in a
drop of the average speedup.
Altruistic Agents accept every job, regardless of the
circumstances or cooperation partners.
Sloppy Agents are cooperative but do only accept a
certain percentage of WUs offered to them (Edenhofer
et al. (2015)).
Dishonest Agents (D...), e.g. Dishonest Adaptive
Agents (DADAs) or Dishonest Egoistic Agents
(DEGOs), give false ratings with the aim to harm others
and to improve their own reputation compared to other
agents. In our system, dishonest ratings are modelled by
inverting the actual rating, e.g. -1 instead of 1.
4 The TruDiPhe Approach
In Section 2.2, we introduced a way of disseminating
the common scent inside an ant colony which can
be compared to decentralised trust management: The
odours of all ants in the colony are mixed up to one
common colony scent. The smell acts like a token of trust
which is passed around between members of the colony.
In the following, we will algorithmically model this
kind of decentralised trust management. We start by
introducing our novel approach to digital pheromones
called TruDiPhes (Trusted Digital Pheromones). The
term ’TruDiPhe’ refers to both the concept and one
single message, depending on (and being clear from) the
context.
4.1 Definition of TruDiPhe
A TruDiPhe includes the following information about
the trust transmitted: the creator x and the recipient y
of the scent, a timestamp TS (of the creation), the Type
(describing the context of the trust value), and amount
(trust value TV ∈ N). A message TDP representing a
TruDiPhe is described in Equation 2 (adapted from
Singh & Liu (2003)):
TDP (x, y, TS, TV, Type) =
(Px(By, TV, TS, Type), Bx)
(2)
Pz and Bz stand for the private and public key of an
agent z, z ∈ {x, y}, Pz(msg) or Bz(msg) represent the
message resulting from the encoding of the message msg
with the private / public key of agent z (see Rouse (2016)
for information about assymetric cryptography). We will
only work with the ’generic’ type in this article, as this
is sufficient for the demonstration of the advantages of
our approach. Every agent with a copy of the TruDiPhe
is called its owner.
TruDiPhes have five main characteristics, which
correspond to the decisive properties of recognition
pheromones:
(1) They stick to a target and cannot be removed
easily. Trust management is mainly used in open,
distributed networks. Due to uncertainty about the
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behaviour of the agents and their autonomy, only
positive trust values about the agent are stored at the
agent itself, so it has no advantage when removing
a TruDiPhe. This is one important fact to guarantee
full distributedness and highlights the analogy to ant
pheromones: If only positive ratings are used in the
reputation system, the trust values can be stored at
their recipients instead of their creators.
(2) They cannot be altered or counterfeited. This
is guarantueed by the use of asymmetric cryptography.
By encoding all information with the private key Px,
a TruDiPhe cannot be altered without destroying all
information stored in it. It cannot be counterfeited
without possessing the private key. From the encoded
message itself it is impossible to tell who encoded the
message. Therefore, the creator’s public key is appended:
any other agent can validate the authenticity of the
message without having to know the creator and its
public key in advance. If the encoded message or the
public key is altered, the decoded message will not show
the correct public key of the TruDiPhe’s recipient.
(3) They are transferable to other agents. This is
fulfilled, since a TruDiPhe is a simple message and can
be passed freely in the network.
(4) Their intensity can vary. The creator of a
message chooses the trust value freely, a greater value
represents a higher intensity. In the TDG, the trust value
could, for example, differ dependent on the work unit
size, or the processing time.
(5) They evaporate over time. Since our TruDiPhes
include a time stamp, this property is also satisfied.
Even more, it gives each agent the possibility to choose
from which period of time it wants to take odours into
account for its considerations about work distribution.
Furthermore, the timestamp helps to prevent the
recipient from simply duplicating TruDiPhes for a
higher, unjustifiably better rating.
4.2 Schematic Comparison of TruDiPhe to Other
Reputation Systems
In the TDG, agents share computing resources with
other agents. If successful interaction takes place (i.e. the
worker returns the right result), the submitter creates
a TruDiPhe with the trust value, timestamp, and the
public key of the worker. The TruDiPhe is then sent
to the worker (recipient) which may use the TruDiPhe
to ’promote’ itself. Of course, agents are free to store
additional ratings, also negative ones, locally.
When an agent x is interested in the trust values of
an agent y, it asks this agent to send all its relevant
TruDiPhes (i.e. y is recipient and timestamp is in the
right time frame set by the agent or the system protocol).
These collections of TruDiPhes resemble the mixed scent
profiles of ants: Although agents do not exchange their
TruDiPhes, they can mutually add signatures to each
other’s profiles. The more agents in the network have
interacted successfully with the queried agent, the more
different signatures its profile contains, and hence, the
more trustworthy it is. Note that TruDiPhes cannot
actually mix because of the cryptographic encryption,
but this is irrelevant for the algorithmic properties.
Xiong & Liu (2004) found that a dynamical time frame
(based on recent behaviour) outperforms a static one.
This approach should therefore be chosen for systems
with TruDiPhes.
In most systems, reputation managers exist, e.g.
Score Managers in EigenTrust (Kamvar et al. (2003)),
Trust Managers in PeerTrust (Xiong & Liu (2004)), or
Trust-Holding Agents (THAs) in TrustMe (Singh & Liu
(2003)), which maintain central reputation databases,
mapped to the agents by hash functions. Figure 1
shows the schematic process of an agent b learning
the reputation of an agent a in a system relying on
consolidating agents: b looks up the reputation manager
of a, which is c. Then, b sends a request for the reputation
of a to c, which queries every node in the network (here:
x, y and z) for their experiences with a. After receiving
all replies, c calculates the reputation of a, and returns
it to b.
3. TV of a: "3"
3. TV of a: "1"
3. T
V o
f a:
 "-2
"
1. Query for reputation of a
2. Query for trust values for a
4. Calculation of 
the reputation r of a
5. Returning r
x
y
z
c b
Figure 1 The schematic calculation of agent a’s
reputation in most systems with centralised trust
value access schemes.
In our system (see Figure 2), trust values are queried
directly from the recipients of trust values and are
’pushed’ instead of ’pulled’: After interacting with a,
the agents x, y and z immediately send a TruDiPhe
containing the trust value for that interaction to a. Agent
b can now ask a for the TruDiPhes from a specific time
frame (here: 1 to 3), b is then responsible for calculating
the reputation of others by themselves.
1. TDP(x,a,1,1)
2. TDP(y,a,2,4)
3. T
DP(
z,a,
3,3)
4. Query for time frame 1-3
x
y
z
a b
TDP(x,a,1,1)
TDP(y,a,2,4)
TDP(z,a,3,3)
5. Reply:
6. Calculation of 
the reputation of a
Figure 2 The schematic calculation of agent a’s
reputation with TruDiPhes.
With these definitions, we will now describe the
characteristics of the TruDiPhe protocol.
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4.3 Properties of the Protocol
A selection of properties (originally listed by Singh &
Liu (2003) for their system TrustMe) for the concept of
TruDiPhes is discussed in the following:
Anonymity and Accountability: Identities in
TruDiPhe are anonymous in the sense that their real
world counterparts do not need to be known to other
members, although ratings can still be traced back to
their creators.
Reliability: Cryptography secures that ratings in
TruDiPhe cannot be manipulated. Dishonest ratings
cannot be avoided in any system, however.
Persistence: Since the owner and the recipient of a
TruDiPhe are the same, ratings are kept in the system
for as long as they are needed. When an agent leaves
the system, it takes all of the trust values with it which
affect itself (except for direct experience ratings stored at
its interaction partners). This is the ideal case regarding
storage space.
Small decision time: Only one message is needed
to find out the reputation of an agent in TruDiPhe,
while other systems use multiple requests: at least two
to three reputation managers need to be contacted to
exclude system failures or dishonest ratings. If an agent
is unavailable for a reputation request in TruDiPhe, it is
also unavailable for work.
Ease of storing trust values: Again, only one message
is required to contribute a trust value to the system.
5 Evaluation
As discussed above, TruDiPhe is a novel distributed
approach to the dissemination of trust values. In this
section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this method.
Furthermore, evaluating single components of the
system enables the exact localisation of performance
gains and losses. We already introduced the simulation
environment and the agent types in Section 3. Initially,
we formulate the research hypothesis that is investigated
using the experimental evaluation. Afterwards, we
verify that the hypothesis holds in terms of two
experiments, before we discuss the results. We are not
interested in sophisticated analysis of the application
scenario, since we already compared the underlying
concept against related work in Reif et al. (2016).
Consequently, we simplify the particular trust ratings
issued by individual agents (without loss of generality)
as follows: A successful interaction results in a single
positive value of ’1’. This is encoded as follows:
Psubmitter(Bworker, 1, TS,GenericType), Bsubmitter.
Compared to previous work, this does not affect the
trust mechanism itself. In turn, it simplifies the trust-
analysis since we do not have to distinguish between
different kinds of ratings and the implications on the
interpretation process.
We define the following hypothesis as basis for our
experimental evaluation:
If a certain percentage of agents in a TDG
is dishonest, reputation systems using TruDiPhes
outperform comparable systems with reputation
managers.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The simulation runs in discrete time steps (ticks).
Processing one work unit (WU) requires 750 to 1000
ticks, one job is composed of 7 to 15 WUs. The
simulation runs 300000 ticks for each experiment with
100 agents, whereby an agent can distribute only one
work unit in one tick. If a WU cannot be passed
on for the third time, e.g. due to false computation
results or rejection, the agent processes the WU itself.
Overhead in terms of bandwidth and messaging costs
are neglected in the simulation results, since both are
comparable to the standard mechanism of the TDG.
For all other simulation parameters, we used the finding
of the parameter study presented in Klejnowski (2014).
We compare the TruDiPhe-implementation to the same
implementation with two differences:
1. Negative trust ratings are allowed (for TruDiPhe,
all negative ratings are set to 0)
2. We assume the ”worst case”, i.e the reputation
manager as well as the dishonest agents in the
system are collaborating by inverting all trust
ratings for a maximum falsifying impact.
These two differences capture the workings of traditional
reputation manager systems, as described in Section 2,
and is referred to as ”Others” in the figures.
5.2 Experimental Results
In the first experiment, we simulate a system with a fixed
amount of EGO and a varying amount of DADA. At the
beginning of the simulation, there are 80 ADA and 20
EGO. In steps of 5% (of the initial 80 ADA), DADA are
incorporated into the system, replacing the respective
amount of ADA. In other systems, the higher percentage
of dishonest ratings is translated into a higher percentage
of dishonest agents. This is reasonable, since for the final
trust value it does not matter whether the value was
handled by one or two agents in the system, as long as
their probability to be dishonest is the same. The results
of the simulation runs are depicted in Figure 3.
In TruDiPhe, the ADA can keep their performance
level relatively stable, independent from how many
dishonest agents participate in the system. DADA which
are being added to the system can only bring limited
damage to TruDiPhe, as they can rate ADA with 0
as a minimum. This means that they are not able to
pull down the reputation values as much as in the
other systems where ratings lower than 0 are allowed.
ADA keep a reputation comparable to the EGO and,
in consequence, are chosen to process WUs more often
than in the other systems—where a higher percentage
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Figure 3 Average speedup of ADAs for different
percentages of DADAs and a fixed amount of
EGOs in ’traditional’ systems (with reputation
managers) compared to a simulation with
TruDiPhe with a total of 100 agents.
of dishonest ratings results in a clearly worse and
decreasing performance.
In the second experiment, we combine DEGO and
dishonest reputation managers. We start with 100
ADA and introduce DEGO in 5% steps. As dishonest
reputation managers can only change reputation values
and do not have any other harmful affect on the system,
the same amount of DEGO as in TruDiPhe is used, while
the other dishonest agents are made up of DADA. The
results are shown in Figure 4.
Figure 4 Average speedup of ADAs for different
percentages of DEGOs in traditional systems with
reputation managers and in TruDiPhe (100
agents).
As we can see, TruDiPhe outperforms the other
systems from about 11% DEGO on. If more than a
quarter of agents is dishonest in the case of other
systems, the benefit of participating in the system is
worse than processing the jobs by oneself. It should
be noted that this, as well as the previous Figure 3,
depicts the worst case of dishonest behaviour. The
ratings are inverted in every case, which is improbable
for systems in which dishonest reputation managers and
dishonest trust creators do not cooperate closely with
each other. Rather, one could assume that dishonest
reputation managers sometimes reverse false ratings of
other dishonest agents, changing them back to their
original and correct value.
Systems with predominantly honest agents, such
as traditional systems like TrustMe, fare better than
systems with TruDiPhe. This is mainly due to the
limitation of TruDiPhe to positive ratings. As soon
as (dishonest) agents start to lie about trust values,
systems with only positive ratings have an advantage.
Furthermore, TruDiPhe has the additional benefit that
no intermediaries (in terms of reputation managers)
are employed which could manipulate the trust values.
The correctness of the values is ensured by asymmetric
encryption. When taking an increased probability of
dishonest ratings into account, systems with traditional
reputation managers give a lot less benefit to the honest
and benevolent participants of the system than systems
with TruDiPhes.
These considerations affirm the statement of our
hypothesis. The “certain percentage” of dishonest agents
is between 10 % and 20 % in our experiments, but is
generally dependent on the exact reputation system
using TruDiPhes, the amount of agents in the system,
and other participating agent types
6 Conclusion
In this article, we presented a novel approach to
ensure a fully distributed reputation system for
open, heterogeneous, trusted Multi-agent Systems. This
approach, called ’TruDiPhe’, is inspired by concepts
found in nature, more precisely in the chemical
communication and nestmate recognition observed in
ant colonies. TruDiPhe replaces a central reputation
database or the need for reputation managers by storing
trust values decentrally at the receiving agents. With the
concept of asymmetric encryption, a TruDiPhe message
ensures important aspects such as counterfeit security
and copy protection.
The application scenario Trusted Desktop Grid is
a simulation of an open Multi-agent System. In the
presented evaluations, we compared the TDG with its
reputation managers (as placeholder for comparable
other systems) to the TDG with TruDiPhe applied.
The results showed that the extension with TruDiPhe
outperforms other systems as soon as there are more
than about 10% to 20% malicious agents.
For future work, we want to answer more questions
on the concept of TruDiPhe and distributed verification
in general. Examples are: Is TruDiPhe able to counter
more security threats, e.g. whitewashing or sybil attacks?
If not, is it extendable in an apropriate way? How
do systems with transitive trust fare against systems
without in the face of dishonest agents?
Decentralised Trust-Management Inspired By Ant Pheromones 9
References
Aberer, K., Despotovic, Z., Galuba, W. & Kellerer,
W. (2006), The complex facets of reputation and
trust, in ‘Computational Intelligence, Theory and
Applications’, Springer, pp. 281–294.
Anderson, D. & Fedak, G. (2006), The Computational
and Storage Potential of Volunteer Computing, in
‘Proc. of CCGRID 2006’, IEEE, pp. 73–80.
Anglano, C., Canonico, M., Guazzone, M., Botta, M.,
Rabellino, S., Arena, S. & Girardi, G. (2008), ‘Peer-to-
Peer Desktop Grids in the Real World: The ShareGrid
Project’, Proc. of CCGrid 2008 pp. 609–614.
Bagne`res, A.-G. & Lorenzi, M. C. (2010), Chemical
deception/mimicry using cuticular hydrocarbons, in
G. J. Blomquist & A.-G. Bagnres, eds, ‘Insect
Hydrocarbons’, Cambridge University Press, pp. 282–
324. Cambridge Books Online.
Bernard, Y., Klejnowski, L., Ha¨hner, J. & Mu¨ller-
Schloer, C. (2010), Towards trust in desktop
grid systems, in ‘10th IEEE/ACM International
Conference on Cluster, Cloud and Grid Computing,
CCGrid 2010, 17-20 May 2010, Melbourne, Victoria,
Australia’, pp. 637–642.
Carbo, J., Molina, J. M. & Davila, J. (2002), Comparing
predictions of sporas vs. a fuzzy reputation system, in
‘3rd International Conference on Fuzzy Sets and Fuzzy
Systems’, Vol. 200, Citeseer, pp. 147–153.
Carbo, J., Molina, J. M. & Davila, J. (2003),
‘Trust management through fuzzy reputation’,
International Journal of Cooperative Information
Systems 12(01), 135–155.
Carrara, E. & Hogben, G. (2007), ‘Enisa position paper
no. 2 reputation-based systems: a security analysis’.
Castelfranchi, C. & Falcone, R. (2010), Trust Theory:
A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model, Vol. 18,
John Wiley & Sons.
Chakravarti, A. J., Baumgartner, G. & Lauria,
M. (2004), Application-Specific Scheduling for the
Organic Grid, in ‘Proc. of GRID 2004 Workshops’,
IEEE, Washington, DC, USA, pp. 146–155.
Choi, S., Buyya, R., Kim, H. & Byun, E. (2008),
A taxonomy of desktop grids and its mapping to
state of the art systems, Technical report, Grid
Computing and Dist. Sys. Laboratory, The University
of Melbourne.
d’Ettorre, P. & Lenoir, A. (2010), Nestmate recognition,
in ‘Ant Ecology’, Oxford University Press, pp. 109–
194.
Dickinson, M. H. (1999), ‘Bionics: Biological Insight
Into Mechanical Design’, Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences 96(25), 14208–14209.
Edenhofer, S., Stifter, C., Ja¨nen, U., Kantert, J.,
Tomforde, S., Ha¨hner, J. & Mu¨ller-Schloer, C. (2015),
An accusation-based strategy to handle undesirable
behaviour in multi-agent systems, in ‘2015 IEEE
International Conference on Autonomic Computing,
Grenoble, France, July 7-10, 2015’, pp. 243–248.
Fedak, G., Germain, C., Neri, V. & Cappello, F. (2001),
Xtremweb: A Generic Global Computing System, in
‘Cluster Computing and the Grid, 2001. Proceedings.
First IEEE/ACM International Symposium on’,
pp. 582–587.
Greengard, S. (2015), The Internet of Things, MIT
Press Essential Knowledge, MIT Press. ISBN-13: 978-
0262527736.
Ho¨lldobler, B. & Wilson, E. O. (2009), The
Superorganism: The Beauty, Elegance, and
Strangeness of Insect Societies, W. W. Norton and
Company.
Kamvar, S. D., Schlosser, M. T. & Garcia-Molina,
H. (2003), The eigentrust algorithm for reputation
management in p2p networks, in ‘Proceedings of the
12th international conference on World Wide Web’,
ACM, pp. 640–651.
Kantert, J., Edenhofer, S., Tomforde, S. & Mu¨ller-
Schloer, C. (2015), Representation of Trust and
Reputation in Self-Managed Computing Systems, in
‘IEEE 13th International Conference on Dependable,
Autonomic and Secure Computing, DASC 2015’,
IEEE, Liverpool, UK, pp. 1827–1834.
Klejnowski, L. (2014), Trusted Community: A Novel
Multiagent Organisation for Open Distributed
Systems, PhD thesis, University of Hannover.
Leonhardt, S. D., Menzel, F., Nehring, V. & Schmitt, T.
(2016), ‘Ecology and evolution of communication in
social insects’, Cell 164(6), 1277–1287.
Luhmann, N. (1979), Trust and Power, Chichester:
Wiley.
Mnif, M. & Mu¨ller-Schloer, C. (2006), Quantitative
emergence, in ‘Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE
Mountain Workshop on Adaptive and Learning
Systems (SMCals 2006), held 24 Jul - 26 Jul 2006,
Utah State University College of Engineering Logan,
UT, USA’, IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, USA, pp. 78–84.
Morgan, E. D. (2009), ‘Trail pheromones of ants’,
Physiological Entomology 34(1), 1–17.
Mui, L. (2002), Computational Models of Trust and
Reputation: Agents, Evolutionary Games, and Social
Networks, PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Mu¨ller-Schloer, C., Schmeck, H. & Ungerer, T. (2011),
Organic ComputingA Paradigm Shift for Complex
Systems, Vol. 1, Springer Science & Business Media.
10 S. Edenhofer et al.
Ramchurn, S. D., Huynh, D. & Jennings, N. R. (2004),
‘Trust in Multi-agent Systems’, The Knowledge
Engineering Review 19(01), 1–25.
Reif, W., Anders, G., Seebach, H., Stegho¨fer, J.-P.,
Andre, E., Ha¨hner, J., Mu¨ller-Schloer, C. & Ungerer,
T. (2016), Trustworthy Open Self-Organising Systems,
Springer. To appear.
Rouse, M. (2016), ‘Public-key encrpytion’. Last accessed:
2016-02-10.
Sabater, J. & Sierra, C. (2005), ‘Review on
computational trust and reputation models’, Artificial
Intelligence Review 24(1), 33–60.
Singh, A. & Liu, L. (2003), Trustme: Anonymous
management of trust relationships in decentralized
p2p systems, in ‘Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2003.(P2P
2003). Proceedings. Third International Conference
on’, IEEE, pp. 142–149.
Tomforde, S., Ha¨hner, J., Seebach, H., Reif, W., Sick,
B., Wacker, A. & Scholtes, I. (2014), Engineering
and Mastering Interwoven Systems, in ‘ARCS 2014
- 27th International Conference on Architecture
of Computing Systems, Workshop Proceedings,
February 25-28, 2014, Luebeck, Germany, University
of Luebeck, Institute of Computer Engineering’, pp. 1–
8.
Vu, H. L. (2010), High Quality P2P Service Provisioning
via Decentralized Trust Management, PhD thesis,
E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne.
Wang, Y. & Vassileva, J. (2004), Trust-Based
Community Formation in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing
Networks, in ‘Proc. on Web Intelligence’, pp. 341–348.
Weiser, M. (1991), ‘The computer for the 21st century’,
Scientific American 265(3), 66–75.
Wooldridge, M. J. (2001), Introduction to Multiagent
Systems, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, NY,
USA.
Xiong, L. & Liu, L. (2004), ‘Peertrust: Supporting
reputation-based trust for peer-to-peer electronic
communities’, Knowledge and Data Engineering,
IEEE Transactions on 16(7), 843–857.
Zacharia, G. & Maes, P. (2000), ‘Trust management
through reputation mechanisms’, Applied Artificial
Intelligence 14(9), 881–907.
